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Abstract. There is a debate regarding the impact of swing or independent voters in American 
politics.  While some argue that swing voters either do not swing or have a marginal impact on 
campaigns, the decline in voter partisan identification and the rise of independents means that 
they have a potential impact on elections, making them a desirable commodity to candidates. 
Additionally, presidential elections represent a unique case for swing voters.  A robust 
literature notes that during the presidential primary and caucus process, voters in states such as 
Iowa or New Hampshire effectively have a greater voice in the election than those in other 
states.  This is due to the number of voters in these states, and the strategic importance of 
having their primaries and caucuses positioned at the beginning of the presidential selection 
process.  Additionally, the Electoral College is criticized as giving disproportionate influence to 
some voters or states, or as otherwise distorting the results in presidential elections because of 
its winner-take-all method of allocating votes in 48 or the 50 states. But these assertions 
notwithstanding, can the impact or distortion that swing-voters have in some states compared 
to others, in terms of their relative influence on presidential elections, be quantified?  Relatedly, 
does the Electoral College distort the impact of swing voters?  This study presents a new 
method to assess the impact of swing voters within the winner-take-all method that states use to 
allocate electoral votes.  By looking at several recent U.S. presidential elections, we quantify 
how the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes produces disparities in the voting 
power of citizens across states. 
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1. Introduction 
In the U.S., voting is a fundamental right characterized, at least in theory, by the requirement of 
all votes carrying “equal weight.”  This concept is perhaps best expressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in reapportionment decisions that followed the well-known “one person, one vote” 
philosophy.  This precedent demands nearly mathematical equality in the apportionment of 
congressional districts and in the requirement that the counting of votes assigns equal weight to 
each voter across a state. Moreover, as it became clear in the Bush v. Gore Supreme Court 
decision of 2000, voters in one part of the state would not face a standard for the counting of 
their votes that differed from that in other parts of the state.  In other words, geography would 
not impact voting power and hence not interfere with voting rights. 
     Despite the equal weight imperative, as a practical matter, some votes do count more than 
others. There is a debate regarding the impact of swing or independent voters in American 
politics (Campbell, 2008; Shaw, 2008).  While some argue that swing voters either do not swing 
or have a marginal impact on campaigns, the decline in voter partisan identification and the rise 
of independents means that they have a potential impact on elections, making them a desirable 
commodity to candidates (Pomper, 1975; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Campbell, 2008; Lewis-Beck, 
2008). Additionally, presidential elections represent a unique case for swing voters.  A robust 
literature notes that during the presidential primary and caucus process, voters in states such as 
Iowa or New Hampshire effectively have a greater voice in the election than those in other 
states (Schier, 1980; Bartles, 1989; Brady, 1989; Mixon and Hobson, 2001; Mayer and Busch, 2004; 
Hull, 2008).  This is due to the number of voters in these states, and the strategic importance of 
having their primaries and caucuses positioned at the beginning of the presidential selection 
  
process.  Additionally, the Electoral College is criticized as giving disproportionate influence to 
some voters or states, or as otherwise distorting the results in presidential elections because of 
its winner-take-all method of allocating votes in 48 or the 50 states (Pomper, 2001: 150). But 
these assertions notwithstanding, can the impact or distortion that swing-voters have in some 
states compared to others, in terms of their relative influence on presidential elections, be 
quantified?  Relatedly, does the Electoral College distort the impact of swing voters?  This study 
presents a new method to assess the impact of swing voters within the winner-take-all method 
that states use to allocate electoral votes.  By looking at several recent U.S. presidential elections, 
we quantify how the winner-take-all method of allocating electoral votes produces disparities in 
the voting power of citizens across states. 
2. Presidential Elections and the Electoral College 
The U.S. Electoral College is perhaps one of the oddest institutions in American politics. For 
those who teach it to undergraduates, it is often the subject of significant confusion, leaving 
students to wonder why it even exists.  The framers of the Constitution defended it as critical to 
producing “extraordinary persons” as presidents because they would be selected by “men most 
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station” of the presidency (Madison, 1937: 444).  
Others, such as Martin Diamond, have justified it as a constitutional system meant to protect 
individual and minority rights, or as a mechanism to overcome regionalism (Diamond, 1959: 
52). In Diamond’s view, it, along with the principles of separation of powers and checks and 
balances, was necessary to thwart the dangers of factionalism that a popular government posed.  
Others have noted that, with an Electoral College, recounts would not need to be done 
nationally, but only in specific jurisdictions where there were disputes (Posner, 2001: 224-227). 
  
     The Electoral College has also had its detractors. It has been criticized as anti-democratic, as 
denying individual liberty and the fundamental right to vote, and as no longer serving the 
purpose for which it was established (Glennon, 1992).  Following the 2000 presidential election–
where George Bush lost the national popular vote to Al Gore but won the Electoral College 
vote–those criticisms intensified (Bugliosi, 2001; Dershowitz, 2001).  Others maintain that the 
Electoral College serves to depress and/or distort voter turnout (Keyssar, 2006; Cebula, 2002) or 
that it creates a system of wasted votes (Cebula and Meads, 2008; Edwards, 2004).  Still others 
see the Electoral College as discouraging the formation and support of third parties (Durban, 
1992). 
     A further criticism of the Electoral College derives less from its constitutional design than 
from the practice of all states, except for Maine and Nebraska, to award all of their electoral 
votes to the presidential candidate receiving the plurality of the popular vote in their state 
(Greene, 2001: 25; Posner, 2001: 239; Pomper, 2001: 150).  During the 2004 presidential election, 
voters in Colorado defeated a state ballot measure to amend their state’s constitution to award 
their state’s electoral votes proportional to their popular vote breakdown.  Others have noted 
how the Electoral College disproportionately weights the votes of smaller states relative to 
larger states (Banzhaf, 1968).  The disproportionate weighting occurs because each state’s 
Electoral College votes are equal to the sum of its votes in the U.S. House of Representatives 
and the U.S. Senate.  U.S. House votes are apportioned on the basis of population, with each 
state guaranteed at least one representative, regardless of population.  U.S. Senate votes are not. 
Each state receives two U.S. Senate votes, regardless of its population.  California, the most 
populous state, with about 37.3 million residents according to the 2010 census, receives the 
same number of US Senate votes – two – as Wyoming, the least populous state, with 563,626 
  
residents.  As a result of the “plus-two” U.S. Senate bonus, smaller states pack a slightly larger 
Electoral College punch relative to their populations than do larger states. 
     More significant, though, is the effect of the winner-take-all allocation of each state’s 
Electoral College votes.  At present, the electoral votes in all but two states are allocated to each 
state’s popular-vote winner.  Such a winner-take-all allocation is not mandated by the U.S. 
Constitution.  The U.S. Constitution provides that each state’s electors shall be appointed in a 
manner to be determined by its legislature. The only stipulation is that a sitting member of 
Congress cannot also serve as an elector. 
     Given that the U.S. Constitution leaves the determination of how electors are appointed to 
the state legislatures, it is not surprising that they have all (with the exception of Maine and 
Nebraska) opted for a winner-take-all allocation in order to maximize their influence.  At the 
state level, such a course of action is a rational one.  Allocating its electors on a winner-take-all 
basis boosts the likelihood that candidates will visit a state and pay attention to its concerns.  If, 
for example, Oregon, with its relatively small population is shaping up as a swing state, a last-
minute trip to the state might appear attractive.  If it went well, it could have the effect of 
swinging the full complement of the state’s Electoral College votes on election day. Candidates 
would be less likely to court the state’s voters if the state’s Electoral College votes were 
allocated on some other basis.  The result is that every state, clamoring for national candidates’ 
attention, ends up with a winner-take-all allocation. 
     While Mayhew (2010: 196-198) contends there is no partisan bias to the Electoral College, 
there is some evidence that it does distort election results (Cebula and Meads, 2008).  The 
winner-take-all effect ensures that small swings in state-vote margins can disproportionately 
influence the Electoral College count.  In a close election, such swings can even determine the 
winner.  The extreme case is the 2000 presidential election, where 537 popular votes in Florida 
  
represented the difference in awarding the state’s then-25 Electoral College votes, and, 
ultimately, the election for Bush over Gore.  Four years later, in the presidential election of 2004, 
the margin of victory for Bush over Democrat John F. Kerry was the 119,000 votes in Ohio that 
swung the state’s 20 Electoral College votes.  In the presidential election of 1976, the margin of 
victory for Democrat Jimmy Carter over Republican Gerald Ford amounted to 175,000 votes in 
three states.  Nearly half of Carter’s 297-240 Electoral College vote margin over Ford was 
attributable to his winning Ohio.  Carter won Ohio’s then-25 Electoral College votes by a 
margin of 11,116 popular votes. 
     The turmoil of the presidential election of 2000 left many uneasy with the Electoral College. 
In that election, as noted above, the margin of victory for Republican George W. Bush over 
Democrat Albert Gore was a mere 537 popular votes in Florida.  Those votes – out of nearly six 
million votes cast in the state – swung the state’s then-25 Electoral College votes to Bush, who 
defeated Gore by 271 to 267 in the Electoral College.  For five weeks after the polls closed, the 
election’s outcome was in doubt, as the Bush and Gore camps battled in the courts for the 
disputed Florida electors.  It took the intervention of the U.S. Supreme Court to settle the 
outcome of the election in Florida, and, thus, the nation.  While the exceedingly narrow margin 
in Florida in 2000 was atypical, the phenomenon of some states’ relatively small margins of 
victory disproportionately influencing an election’s outcome has not been as uncommon.  The 
winner-take-all allocation of each state’s Electoral College votes ensures that it will happen in 
every election.  Under winner-take-all, some states’ votes will count for more than others – in 
some cases, hundreds or even thousands of times more – in determining the outcome.  It 
happens whether the election is a cliffhanger or a landslide.  The only difference, then, from one 
election to the next is its magnitude. 
  
     Since then there has been a movement started – the National Popular Vote Interstate 
Compact – to effectively alter the Electoral College.  This proposal, in lieu of a constitutional 
amendment, would require a state to allocate its electoral votes according to whoever is the 
winner in the national popular vote for president.  The animus behind this proposal is not only 
to make the popular vote more directly determinative in presidential elections, but also to 
address the other perceived distortions or problems (such as reduced or distorted voter 
participation rates) associated with the institution, at least given the current winner-take-all 
system for allocating electoral votes. 
3. Winner-Take-All Distortions: A Statistical Analysis 
As noted, the winner-take-all method to allocate electoral votes distorts presidential elections.  
It is possible to quantify the magnitude of this distortion.  The critical element is the swing 
votes—the votes that represented the margin of victory for the winning candidate.  They are the 
votes that swung the state to the winning candidate.  The other votes for each major-party 
candidate offset each other.  The swing votes are the ones that are of interest. 
     The key is to determine what the Electoral College’s impact is on each state’s swing votes in 
an election.  That is done here, for each state, by dividing the number of Electoral College votes 
at stake (N) by the margin of victory for the winning candidate (M). Thus, the swing voters 
impact can be expressed as S = N/M.  Invariably, the margin of victory dwarfs the number of 
Electoral College votes, and the S-fraction is minute. For ease of interpretation, each state’s  
S-fraction can be normalized with respect to the middle-ranking (median) state for that election. 
The states can then be ranked, in order of their swing voters’ Electoral College impact, for each 
election. 
  
     In the presidential election of 2008, the Democratic ticket of Senator Barack Obama and 
Senator Joseph Biden defeated the Republican ticket of Senator John McCain and Governor 
Sarah Palin by a 365-173 Electoral College margin.  Obama-Biden won 28 states (and the District 
of Columbia), to 22 states for McCain-Palin.  The popular vote tally was 69.5 million votes for 
Obama-Biden to 59.9 million votes for McCain-Palin.  Every state but two allocated its Electoral 
College votes on a winner-take-all basis.  The remaining two states, Maine and Nebraska, 
allocated their Electoral College votes according to the number of congressional districts. 
     The state with the smallest popular-vote margin relative to the number of Electoral College 
votes at stake was Missouri.  Its eleven Electoral College went for McCain-Palin by a margin of 
3,903 popular votes.  Those swing votes, representing the margin of victory for one ticket over 
the other, are the key.  Dividing the number of Electoral College votes at stake by the popular 
vote margin (11/3,903) yields the Electoral College impact of each swing vote in that state.  In 
Missouri, it came to 0.0028.  Missouri's Electoral College votes per swing-vote ratio, or S, was 
larger than that of any other state. 
     The full-slate of state-by-state results for the 2008 presidential election is presented in Table 1. 
The states are ranked by the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in each state, S, with the 
results normalized relative to the median state.  Kansas was the median state for the 2008 
election.  Its six Electoral College votes went for McCain-Palin by a margin of 184,890 popular 
votes.  Dividing the Electoral College votes at stake in Kansas by the state’s popular vote 
margin yields the result of 0.000032 Electoral College votes per swing vote in Kansas.  That 
result was normalized to 1.0 for purposes of comparison with the other states.  The same 
calculations were performed for the other states (except for Maine and Nebraska) plus the 
District of Columbia, with the results expressed relative to the normalized value for Kansas. 
  
     The differences between states shown in Table 1 are sizeable.  Missouri tops the list for the 
2008 election.  A swing vote in Missouri carried 86.85 times the Electoral College impact of one 
in Kansas, the median state.  At the other end of the list is the District of Columbia. The 
District's three Electoral College votes went for Obama-Biden by a popular vote margin of 
228,433.  Dividing the Electoral College votes at stake in the District by its popular vote margin 
produces an S of only 0.000013.  That figure for the District equates to only 0.40 of the value of S 
for Kansas. 
     The two battleground states of Florida and Ohio were near the top of the 2008 list.  Obama-
Biden won Florida’s 27 Electoral College votes by a margin of 236,450 popular votes.  Ohio’s 20 
Electoral College votes also went to Obama-Biden, by a margin of 262,224 popular votes. A 
swing vote in Florida had 3.52 times the Electoral College impact of one in Kansas; one in Ohio 
had 2.35 times the impact of one in Kansas.  Florida was decisive in the victory of the 
Republican Bush-Cheney ticket over the Democratic Gore-Lieberman ticket in 2000.  Four years 
later, Ohio provided the margin of victory in the re-election of the Bush-Cheney ticket against 
the Democratic ticket of Kerry-Edwards.  Interestingly, those two states received 
disproportionate attention in terms of candidate time and advertising resources during the 2008 
campaign. 
     California and New York, the first and third most populous states, were near the bottom of 
the 2008 list.  California’s 55 Electoral College votes went to Obama-Biden by a margin of about 
3.3 million popular votes.  New York awarded its 31 Electoral College votes to Obama-Biden by 
a popular-vote margin of about 2.2 million popular votes.  A swing vote in California had 0.52 
times the Electoral College impact of one in Kansas, while one in New York had 0.43 times the 
impact.  The election’s outcome in both states was treated as almost a foregone conclusion, and 
they received hardly any attention from the candidates other than for fund-raising purposes. 
  
The outcome was relatively closer in Texas, the second-most-populous state.  Texas awarded its 
34 Electoral College votes to McCain-Palin by a popular-vote margin of 950,695.  A swing-vote 
in Texas carried 1.10 times the impact of one in Kansas. 
     The results for Florida and Ohio relative to those in California and New York underscore 
how the winner-take-all allocation of states’ Electoral College votes serves to underweight votes 
from the large-margin states.  Swing votes from the large-margin states carry a smaller impact 
on the election’s outcome than those from the small-margin states.  Clearly, from a political 
strategy standpoint, presidential candidates are well-advised to direct their resources toward 
any of the small-margin states, where a last-minute campaign swing could make the difference 
in moving enough votes to swing the full complement of the state’s Electoral College votes.  
That was what happened in 2008, as the Obama-Biden and McCain-Palin tickets both 
aggressively targeted Florida and Ohio, and largely avoided California and New York. 
     Comparing the first-place and last-place states from the 2008 election, a swing vote in 
Missouri had 215 times the impact of one in the District of Columbia.  However, the 2008 
election was not the only one to demonstrate such a distortion.  In 2004 Bush-Cheney defeated 
Kerry-Lieberman by a 286-252 electoral vote margin, and by 3.5 million popular votes.  Table 1 
presents the state-by-state Electoral College swing-vote impact rankings.  The results are 
normalized with respect to that election’s middle-ranking state, Alaska (AK).  Topping the list 
of states for the 2004 election was Wisconsin (WI).  Its 10 Electoral College votes were won by 
Kerry-Lieberman by a margin of 11,813 popular votes.  Its popular-vote margin was smaller 
than that of any other state, relative to the number of Electoral College votes at stake.1  Alaska 
(AK) was the median state. Bush won its three Electoral College votes by a margin of 65,812 
                                                          
1 Only New Mexico (NM) and New Hampshire (NH) had smaller popular-vote margins, and they both carried fewer 
Electoral College votes. 
  
popular votes.  At the bottom of the list is Utah (UT), which gave Bush-Cheney its five Electoral 
College votes by a margin of 385,337 popular votes.  The popular-vote margin in Utah was over 
30 times larger than that in Wisconsin, yet it swung only half as many Electoral College votes.  
As shown in Table 1 shows, each swing vote in Wisconsin carried 18.57 times the Electoral 
College impact of a swing vote in Alaska.  However, each swing vote in Utah carried only 0.28 
times the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in Alaska.  Wisconsin’s swing votes, then, 
packed 65 times the punch of Utah’s swing votes. 
     Next, we examine the 2000 presidential election.  Bush-Cheney won the electoral vote by 271 
to 267 for Gore-Lieberman, while at the same time losing the popular vote by 500,000 votes.  
Results for the presidential election of 2000 are presented in Table 1.  As the data show, a swing 
vote in Florida carried over one thousand times the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in 
California.  A California swing vote, in turn, carried nearly three times the Electoral College 
impact of a Utah swing vote.  Again, the explanation has to do with the winner-take-all 
allocation of each state’s electors.  The Florida-Utah comparison shows how large the disparity 
can be.  In the case of a large state with a razor-tight margin versus a small state with a runaway 
victor, it can be huge.  In Utah, one-fifth as many Electoral College votes were at stake as in 
Florida, yet Utah’s popular vote margin was almost 600 times that of Florida’s.  Each of 
Florida’s swing votes, then, carried nearly 3,000 times the Electoral College impact of a Utah 
swing vote. 
     The patterns demonstrated in the 2008, 2004, and 2000 elections are not unique.  Table 2 uses 
the same methodology to compute Electoral College voting ratios back to 1960. The 1960 
election was the first with the Electoral College at its current figure of 538 electors, which 
resulted after Alaska and Hawaii joined the union.  Table 2 shows that the 2008 election was not 
unusual in terms of the distortions induced by the winner-take-all allocation of states’ Electoral 
  
College votes.  At the top of the list is the 2000 election, due to the razor-thin margin in Florida 
for the Republican Bush-Cheney ticket over the Democratic Gore-Lieberman ticket.  In 2000, the 
Bush-Cheney ticket won Florida by a mere 537 popular votes.  That popular vote margin swung 
the state's full complement of 25 Electoral College votes, and the election, to the Republican 
ticket.  Florida was the state with the largest Electoral College impact of a swing vote in 2000, 
whereas Utah was the state with the smallest.  Utah's five Electoral College votes went to Bush-
Cheney by a margin of 312,043 popular votes.  Comparing the two states, a swing vote in 
Florida carried 2,905 times the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in Utah. 
     Behind 2000 are the elections of 1960, 1980, and 2008 with the next-largest Electoral College 
distortions.  For each election, the Electoral College impact of a swing vote in the highest-
ranked state was more than 200 times that of a swing vote in the lowest-ranked state.  The 
elections of 1960 and 2000 were cliffhangers, unlike the elections of 1980 and 2008.  Whether the 
election was close or not did not matter – every election saw significant distortions due to the 
winner-take-all allocation of states’ Electoral College votes.  This result will hold whenever the 
election outcomes are not evenly distributed across all the states. 
4. Swing States and Fiscal Federalism: Some Empirical Tests 
Empirical studies making use of the distortions in the Electoral College system are not new.  
Wright’s (1974) econometric explorations of federal government spending in the states during 
the “New Deal” indicate that Electoral College votes per capita across states is the most 
significant explanatory variable.2  At the same time, Brams and Davis (1974) argue the 
presidential campaign resources allocations exhibit a large-state bias, based on Electoral College 
counts.  In an interesting analysis of President Abraham Lincoln’s quest for a second 
presidential term, Anderson and Tollison (1991b) present statistical results suggesting that “. . . 
                                                          
2 See also Anderson and Tollison (1991a) and Couch and Shughart (1998). 
  
Northern causalities [during the Civil War] were partly determined by electoral votes in 1864 . . 
. Given that the Northern troops were organized by states and that President Lincoln sought to 
be reelected, . . . [t]roops from close states were much less likely to suffer causalities . . . [based 
on the logic that]  . . . dead men cannot vote (Tollison, 2004: 558).”  Grier, McDonald and 
Tollison (1995) show, using a pooled sample (1970-1988) of 325 individual bills, that the 
presidential veto is sensitive to winner-take-all electoral voting in the 50 states.  Statistical 
evidence indicates that presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators 
from closely-contested, larger states, where the political payoff is highest.3        
     The Electoral College distortion explored above, which creates asymmetries in the impact of 
a swing vote across the 50 states, carries with it public choice implications regarding fiscal 
federalism.  Mixon and Hobson (2001) show that intergovernmental grants – from the federal 
level to the states – are sensitive to the presidential primaries/caucuses calendar during each 
presidential election cycle.  As Mixon and Hobson (2001) indicate, by rearranging (or 
frontloading) the dates of their primaries and caucuses, states can play a more important role in 
shaping the field of presidential candidates within the two major U.S. political parties.  
Specifically, results in Mixon and Hobson (2001) suggest that a 10.36 days movement (closer to 
1 January) of a state’s primary or caucus results in an increase of $181 million to $600 million 
per presidential election year in federal grants to state governments. 
     In an earlier, yet related study, Mixon and Ladner (1998) apply the public choice model of 
Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975) to events surrounding the 1995 Republican 
takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives.  As part of the Republican campaign platform of 
1994, many candidates adopted the “Contract with America,” which promised to reinforce 
                                                          
3 See Tollison (2004) for a concise review of these and other studies related to the Electoral College and presidential 
politics. 
  
adherence to the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by sending various fiscal 
responsibilities, often accompanied by federal receipts, back to the 50 states.4  As Mixon and 
Ladner (1998: 31) posit, as the federal government bundles tax receipts in the form of block 
grants for states, the value of holding state office would increase, thereby enticing a larger pool 
of candidates for those offices.  Event study results from the panel data set employed by Mixon 
and Ladner (1998) suggest that the block grant movement that occurred after the Republican 
victory in 1994 led to a significant increase in the number of candidates for state house seats. 
     Based on the studies reviewed above, the empirical model expressed in equation (1) is 
proposed as a test of the impact of the importance of swing states’ votes in the presidential 
election: 
RGRANTPOPt+2  = α + β1SWING-St + β2POPUt+2 + β3HOMESTATEt+2 + β4FEDLAND%t+2 + β5ALASKAt+2 
+ β6YEAR + ε.                                                     (1) 
 
In the model above, the subscript, t, represents a presidential election year; in this study, t is 
equal to either 2000 or 2004, meaning that the dependent variable, RGRANTPOP, and several of 
the regressors are measured in years 2002 and 2006.  In equation (1) above, RGRANTPOP is 
equal to real per-capita federal government grants to state and local governments, both for 2002 
and 2006, of the states carried by the victorious presidential candidates in 2000 and 2004, 
respectively.  These grants are a function of six independent variables, including our variable of 
interest, SWING-S, the ratio of Electoral College votes (N) to margin of victory (N) in the 
presidential elections of 2000 and 2004.  If swing states are rewarded by victorious presidential 
candidates, one such potential reward is through intergovernmental grants in the years after the 
                                                          
4 Bills passed by the U.S. House resulting from the “Contract with America” commitment made by Republican 
candidates include the Local Government Law Enforcement Block Grant of 1995, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, 
and the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995.  The second of these three ultimately became law.  Though the other two 
bills failed to pass in the U.S. Senate, elements of them later found their way into various federal spending bills later 
in 1995 and 1996. 
  
presidential election.  This study examines year t+2 in order to allow for lags in the legislative 
process.  The rent-seeking theory described here predicts a positive sign for β1. 
     The variable POPU, the population in each state (in 2002 and 2006) captures essentially what 
is referred to in the economic growth literature as the “catch-up effect.” Here, large states are 
expected to lag behind smaller states in terms of per-capita intergovernmental support.  A 
number of studies have shown that presidential candidates perform well in the general election 
in their home states (Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1983; Kjar and Laband, 2002; Mixon and Tyrone, 
2004).  One would expect, then, that victorious presidents want to reward their home state, 
possibly through larger intergovernmental grants.  As such, HOMESTATE, which is a dummy 
variable equal to one for the home states of the victorious presidential and vice presidential 
candidates in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, is included in equation (1) above.  Given 
this discussion, we expect to find β2 < 0 and β3 > 0. 
     States with large land masses that are owned and administered by the federal government 
are expected, ceteris paribus, to receive fewer federal government grant dollars.  At the same 
time, with its transportation obstacles, oil and gas reserves, and other considerations, Alaska 
might receive larger amounts of federal grants than other states, ceteris paribus.  Thus, 
FEDLAND%, or the percentage of each state’s land area owned by the federal government, and 
ALASKA, a dummy variable equal to one for observations on Alaska, and zero otherwise, are 
included in (1) above.  It is expected that β4 > 0 and β5 > 0.  Finally, the dummy variable YEAR 
above is equal to one for 2006 observations on RGRANTPOP, and zero otherwise (i.e., for 2002 
observations on RGRANTPOP).  It is included to capture any regime or structural effects 
present in the RGRANTPOP data present in the two-year data panel.5    
                                                          
5 Data for this study are taken from various editions of the Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
  
     Summary statistics and results from OLS estimation of equation (1) above are presented in 
Table 3.  The pooled model is jointly significant (F-statistic = 29.71), and produces an R2 of 0.774.  
Additionally, all of the parameter estimates are correctly signed, with five (out of six) 
statistically significant as well.       
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Table 1 
The Impact of a Swing Vote by State: 2000, 2004, and 2008 Presidential Elections 
 
            Top 10, 2008           Top 10, 2004           Top 10, 2000 
                        Rank   State      S                   Rank  State       S                    Rank  State      S        
                    1    MO  86.85         1    WI   18.57         1   FL   1,115.40 
                    2        NC  32.60         2    NM   13.34         2   NM  327.31 
                    3         IN      11.94         3    IA   11.38         3   WI    46.17 
           4    MO   8.33         4    NH   9.57         4   IA    40.47 
           5    FL    3.52         5    NV   5.09         5   OR    24.79 
           6    ND   3.38         6     PA   3.61         6   NH   13.29 
           7    SD   2.88         7    OH   3.21         7   NV  4.44 
           8    OH   2.35         8    HI    2.36         8   MN  4.09 
           9    GA   2.26         9    DE   2.32         9   MO  3.35 
              10    NH   1.80          10    OR   2.28          10   TN   3.28 
 
 
           Bottom 10, 2008         Bottom 10, 2004         Bottom 10, 2000 
                        Rank   State      S                   Rank  State       S                    Rank  State      S        
            40     HI  0.60         40   KY  0.49          40     NJ  0.71 
            41     CT  0.59         41   IN   0.47              OK  0.71 
            42     UT  0.57         42   KS   0.44              42     MT  0.70 
            43     CA  0.52             TX  0.44           43     KS  0.64 
            44     OK  0.47         44   AL  0.41          44     TX  0.56 
                  IL   0.47         45   DC  0.40          45     ID  0.48 
            46     MA  0.46          46   ID     0.39          46     DC  0.47 
                  MD  0.46         47   MA  0.36          47     NY  0.46 
            48     NY  0.43         48   OK  0.34          48     MA  0.39 
            49     DC  0.40         49   UT  0.28          49     UT  0.38 
                                                              
     Note: Complete results for S for each of the years – 2008, 2004, and 2000 – are available from the 
         upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
The Impact of a Swing Vote: Ratio of Top (ST) to Bottom (SB) Ranked States, 1960-2008 
 
            Election    Top-Ranked State   Bottom-Ranked State  ST/SB  
             1960          Hawaii         Massachusetts       832 
             1964         Arizona          Rhode Island      63 
             1968        Arkansas         Massachusetts      71 
             1972         Minnesota          Florida         7 
             1976          Ohio              Utah         88 
             1980        Massachusetts           Utah          288 
             1984        Minnesota            Utah          209 
             1988          Vermont          Florida        16 
             1992         Georgia        District of Columbia   54 
             1996         Nevada         Massachusetts      59 
             2000          Florida             Utah       2,905 
             2004        Wisconsin           Utah        65 
             2008         Missouri        District of Columbia    215    
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Swing Votes and Fiscal Rewards: OLS Regression Results (Dep Var = RGRANTPOP) 
 
                           Pooled Results         2000 Results 
                           Parameter            Parameter 
      Variable                 Estimates              Estimates       
 
      Constant                 926.60*                  943.76*         
                            (19.83)                  (19.60) 
    
      SWING-S                   0.29*                 0.27*           
      [20.7, 145.0]              (1.78)                 (1.92) 
    
      POPU                 −0.04*                −0.04 *           
      [5,030, 4,926]                (−7.74)               (−6.01) 
     
      HOMESTATE               724.75*               564.60*         
      [0.07, 0.25]                (7.67)                (5.27) 
     
      FEDLAND%             −3.32*                −3.97*         
      [19.5, 24.3]               (−3.22)               (−3.59) 
     
      ALASKA                1,166.80 *              1,298.70*       
      [0.03, 0.18]               (9.16)                 (9.36) 
    
      ELECTIONYR              49.11                   n/a        
      [0.51, 0.50]               (1.14)     
 
                            nobs = 59              nobs = 29 
                           F-statistic = 29.71         F-statistic = 27.87 
                             R2 = 0.774              R2 = 0.858 
                                                                 
   Notes: The numbers in brackets beneath the variables are means and standard deviations, respectively.  The mean  
   and standard deviation for RGRANTPOP are 769.8 and 325.8, respectively.  The numbers in parentheses below the         
   parameter estimates are t-statistics, where * denotes significance at the .10 level or better. 
 
 
